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Abstract
While the literature on temptation and self-control has typically
viewed the agent as behaving strategically in order to deal with par-
ticular desires, we view desires as using self-deception as a strategy to
attain ful¯llment. Desires motivate the agent to construct rational-
izations that justify actions that eventually lead her into temptation:
she may form of an exaggerated view of her ability for self-control,
or relax her normative attitude toward indulgence. An axiomatic
model of temptation-driven self-deception is presented. It is demon-
strated that Gul-Pesendorfer's framework puts strong restrictions on
the kind of self-deception it can accommodate. Some implications of
self-deception for welfare policy are derived.
1 Introduction
\This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the
disorders of human life."
{ Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
The seminal decision-theoretic work on temptation, due to Gul and Pe-
sendorfer [11] (henceforth GP), has given rise to various extensions that in-
corporate new dimensions of choice under temptation and applications to
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1various topics. Common to all these studies is a particular view of how
temptation acts on the agent: desires simply appear to the agent at the
moment of choice and demand their satisfaction. This paper promotes an
alternative view of temptation, one that regards desires as being more strate-
gic and employing more sophisticated means to achieving satisfaction. We
hold that, in order to attain satisfaction, desires may motivate a distortion
in the agent's perception of herself or of the world in a way that leads her
into temptation. In a word, temptation can take a disguised form, one that
manifests itself in self-deception.
1.1 Motivation
The psychology literature recognizes the strategic nature of temptation. It
studies not only the strategies that people use to resist temptation, but also
the strategies they use to allow their resolve to fail. Baumeister et al [3, pg
139] write:
[S]mokers face the choice of obtaining immediate grati¯cation
of their addiction or living for a longer period of time. To do this,
smokers must ignore or rationalize the long-term consequences of
smoking. Thus, for instance, they claim that the evidence is weak
linking smoking to cancer, or they fall prey to thoughts that they
are personally invulnerable..
Similarly, individuals who may need to lose weight for health
reasons often ¯nd themselves in tempting situations...Such in-
dividuals are known to engage in irrational thought processes
during such events (\Well, one cookie won't harm me,"..). Thus,
giving in to temptation also involves a number of cognitive strate-
gies that are used to negate the perceived long-term consequences
associated with indulgence.
Unsurprisingly, self-deception plays an important role in the literature on
addiction. Ludwig [18, pg 12-13] writes:
[T]he alcoholic's worst enemy is not the bottle or bad luck but
his own mind, within which is the ever-present Trojan horse of
desire, waiting to smuggle in the enemy when the defenses have
been lulled into complacency. What must be recognized is that
2in this case the brain is much less an organ of rationality than of
rationalization...
[O]ften, the mind of the abstinent alcoholic is so devious as to
come up with a number of seemingly innocuous decisions...that
eventually place the individual in a situation in which a return
to drink becomes inevitable... [If] he could be really honest with
himself, he would recognize that his lapse was not because of bad
luck or fate but because, at some level of awareness, he planned
to do this all along.
Therefore, desires that directly impact the agent at the moment of choice
may also a®ect the agent in the steps leading up to the moment of choice:
they may motivate the agent to construct rationalizations for behaviors she
hitherto preferred to avoid.1 These rationalizations enable the agent to justify
a course of action that eventually leads her into temptation by diminishing
the negative content of the action, often emphasizing the fact that the agent
does not perceive or comprehend the `badness' of her action.2 Thus, the
smoker in the above example explains away the evidence in a self-serving
way, and the dieter mentally reframes her problem as one not involving a
serious con°ict with normative considerations. The facade of reason enables
the agent to protect her self-image.
The nature of self-deception, and even its de¯nition, is subject to much
philosophical debate. The traditional intentionalists understand self-deception
in light of interpersonal deception, thus requiring the self-deceiver to believe p
but intentionally bring about the belief :p (Sartre [22], Fingarette [10]). The
di±culties raised by implied paradoxes has led more recent intentionalists to
weaken the requirement of holding contradictory beliefs to just intentionally
bringing about a belief { motivated by some desire or emotion { despite an
initial recognition that the evidence may not warrant this belief (Talbott
[24], Bermudez [5]).3 Levy [17] suggests that the agent can \avoid the evi-
dence, or situations in which he is likely to be confronted by the evidence, can
1Kunda [16, pg 482] proposes that people who are \motivated to arrive at a particular
conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justi¯cation of their desired conclusion
that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if
they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it" (emphasis added).
2These are examples of what Snyder [23] calls a reframing strategy.
3To be precise, this is a de¯nition of `straight self-deception'. In cases of `twisted
self-deception' the motivated belief is in fact undesired, such as when a jealous husband
believes on weak evidence that his wife is having an a®air (Mele).
3rationalize the evidence he has by imagining unlikely but possible explana-
tions for each piece, and so on" and Talbott [24] suggests that the agent can
exercise selectivity in attention, memory, evidence-gathering and reasoning.
In this view, intentionality is not abandoned, and it remains prere°ective:
the enterprise is prompted by motives that cannot be spelled out without
destroying the enterprise itself.4 Non-intentionalists allow that such forms
of self-deception may be possible, but emphasize that most cases of self-
deception can be also be explained in terms of unintentional motivationally-
biased information processing, without resorting to unconscious beliefs and
intentions (Barnes [2], Mele [19]). The model of self-deception pursued in
this paper is consistent with any of these views.
This paper is concerned primarily with what we refer to as temptation-
driven self-deception, which is motivated by desires that, according to the
agent's normative views, should not be satis¯ed. In such cases, the agent
may distort her perceptions of herself or the world in a way that provides a
rationale and preemptive excuse for submitting to her desire, thereby shield-
ing the agent from feelings of guilt, shame or inferiority both in the present
and future. For perspective, we mention that an alternative motivation for
self-deception may concern long term goals or the need to adjust and func-
tion in a social environment. This accommodates the case of positive illusions
(Taylor [25], Taylor and Brown [27]) that take the form of self-aggrandizing
self-perceptions, exaggerated perception of control over surroundings and un-
realistic optimism, which are viewed as serving an important adaptive func-
tion. Finally, we also mention that wishful thinking is related but distinct
from self-deception because the latter, prompted by some emotional need,
survives in the `teeth of evidence' (by explaining away or reinterpreting the
evidence) while the former does not (Szabados [26]).
1.2 This Paper
We model temptation-driven self-deception in a GP-style setup. Choices are
made in three stages|ex ante, interim, and ex post. Consumption takes
place only in the ex post stage, where the agent faces a menu to choose out
of. This menu is itself chosen in the interim stage, and the menu of menus
4Intentionality explains the internal tension typically identi¯ed with self-deception,
which may be revealed in opacity and indirection (Levy [17]), emotional resistance to
evidence (Talbott [24]) or hypersensitivity to criticism, confrontation or opposing evidence
(Gur and Sackeim [12]).
4available to her in this stage is determined in the ex ante stage. Temptation
acts directly on the agent in the ex post stage, and it acts on her indirectly via
self-deception in the interim stage. Our primitive is the agent's preferences
over menus of menus in the ex ante stage, which is assumed to be prior to
the experience of any temptation or self-deception. At this stage, the agent
is in a cold state, and anticipates her future experience and struggle with
temptation.5
In this framework, we introduce and characterize a behavioral axiom of
self-deception. As discussed above, self-deception is a strategic manipulation
of the agent's reasoning that is motivated by desires. Our axiom draws
from this by requiring that the temptation value of a menu is dependent on
the extent of ex post satisfaction of desires in that menu. In particular, if
temptation is resisted in a menu, the agent is not motivated to choose it in the
interim stage. We ¯nd that the corresponding representation for preference
admits an intuitive interpretation in terms of self-deception.6 Speci¯cally, the
agent behaves as if she is necessarily tempted to relax her ex ante normative
perspective so as to accommodate a greater degree of indulgence, and may
even become blind to the presence of temptation in a menu.
Our result conspicuously rules out the possibility that the agent may
exaggerate her ability to exert self-control and, more generally, misperceive
her future choices. By appealing to behavioral implications of the model,
and by constructing a more general model that incorporates virtuous self-
perception, we show that a consistent tendency to rationalize by appeal to a
virtuous self-perception is inconsistent with self-deception proper: a virtuous
self-perception may in fact obstruct, rather than enhance, the satisfaction of
desire. The lesson we take away is that the GP axioms put strong restrictions
on the nature of self-deception that it can accommodate. For instance, it
cannot accommodate the existence of a \local" virtuous self-image, one that
arises only when it serves the purpose of desire. A richer model of self-
deception would need to be embedded in some extension of GP's model.
The noted general model shares elements with what would be considered
a richer model of self-deception { one where the three distinct kinds of dis-
5Empirical foundations for such a `special period 0' perspective are provided in Noor
[21] on the basis of the hypothesis that distant temptations have smaller impact on current
choices than do immediate temptations. Thus, our ex ante stage may be interpreted as a
time su±ciently distant from the interim stage.
6As we discuss in Section 3, the `internal tension' feature is obtained in the GP model
by ¯at.
5tortions in self-perceptions are present. Although it cannot be regarded as
a general model of self-deception, it lends itself to a substantive discussion
of welfare. For instance, the model implies that agents' welfare is lowered if
menus containing temptation (`vice' menus) are mixed with menus contain-
ing normatively attractive alternatives (`virtuous' menus). This is re°ected
in the following preference over menus of menus:
fa;bg º fa;a [ bg;
where a is a virtuous menu and b a vice menu. Intuitively, larger menus
lend themselves to more excuses. Thus, the agent can more e®ective deceive
herself into choosing a [ b from fa;a [ bg than choosing b from fa;bg. This
provides a rationale for separating vice and virtue, such as via zoning laws
for casinos.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The introduction con-
cludes with a mention of related literature. Section 2 introduces the prim-
itives of the model and presents a benchmark case. Section 3 presents our
model of self-deception. Section 4 extends this model to permit a virtuous
self-perception and derives some of its implications for welfare policy. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
1.3 Related Literature
To our knowledge, the notion of temptation-driven self-deception that we
focus on has not been studied in economics. The behavioral economics liter-
ature discusses positive illusions (Benabou and Tirole [4]) and wishful think-
ing (Brunnermeier and Parker [6]), and the decision-theoretic literature has
modelled temptation only as arising in its naked form and being relevant
mainly at the moment of choice.
The idea that temptation may in°uence the choice of menu is present in
Noor [20, 21] but the mode in which temptation acts there is presumed to
be direct. That is, a menu tempts the agent just as an alternative in that
menu may tempt her. Our paper maintains that an agent may be tempted
by menus, but it hypothesizes that the agent is only tempted by menus that
she can justify choosing. Indeed, we ¯nd that the model of tempting menus
in [20] cannot be regarded as one of self-deception.
A version of our self-deception model also shows up in Noor [21]. There
are two important di®erences, however. First, the model appears in [21]
6mainly as a means to axiomatically unify other temptation models in the
literature. In contrast, the current paper starts by behaviorally de¯ning a
necessary condition for self-deception, and it turns out that the representa-
tion theorem delivers the same model. A novel interpretation of that model
is obtained here as a result. Second, our choice domain di®ers substantially
from [21] and so do our axioms. Intuitively, our axioms are imposed on the
agent's perspective in a cold state { in a special period 0 { where she antici-
pates all temptation (by self-deception or otherwise) but is not subject to it
yet. In contrast, axioms in [21] are imposed directly on choice in a hot state,
when the agent is subject to all kinds of temptation. A counterpart of our
main axiom does not appear in [21].
Finally, on a technical level our results exploit Kopylov's [13, 15] exten-
sions of GP's model to representations with ¯nitely many additive compo-
nents and to dynamic settings with more than two periods.
2 Preliminaries
To aid exposition in subsequent sections, we ¯rst present a basic three-period
extension of GP's model.
Let X = fx;y;z;:::g be the set ¢(Z) of all Borel probability measures
on a compact metric space Z of deterministic consumptions. Let d be the
Prohorov metric of the weak convergence topology on X. More generally, let
X be the class of all Anscombe{Aumann acts f that map a ¯nite state space
­ into ¢(Z), and let d be the corresponding product metric in X.7
Suppose that choices are made in three stages|ex ante, interim, and ex
post|and these choices determine the decision maker's consumption in X
after the ex post stage. Let M1 = fa;b;c;:::g be the set of all interim
menus|non-empty compact subsets a ½ X. Interpret any menu a 2 M1
as a course of action that, if taken at the interim stage, restricts the ex post
choice to the set a ½ X. Endow the space M1 with the Hausdor® metric ¹1
and de¯ne mixtures
®a + (1 ¡ ®)b = f®x + (1 ¡ ®)y : x 2 a; y 2 bg
for all ® 2 [0;1] and menus a;b 2 M1.
7Menus of lotteries are ¯rst used by Gul and Pesendorfer [11] and|for ¯nite Z|by
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [7]. Menus of acts are proposed by Epstein [9].
7Similarly, let M0 = fA;B;C;:::g be the set of all ex ante menus|non-
empty compact subsets A ½ M1. Interpret any menu A 2 M0 as a course of
action that, if taken ex ante, restricts the interim choice to the set A ½ M1.
Endow the space M0 with the Hausdor® metric ¹0 and de¯ne mixtures
®A + (1 ¡ ®)B = f®a + (1 ¡ ®)b : a 2 A; b 2 Bg
for all ® 2 [0;1] and menus A;B 2 M0. Then both M0 and M1 are compact
(see Theorem 3.71 in Aliprantis and Border [1]) and the mixture operations
in these spaces are continuous.
Let a binary relation º on M0 be the decision maker's weak preference
over ex ante menus. Write the symmetric and asymmetric parts of this
relation as » and Â respectively. Note that our model does not take the
decision maker's interim and ex post choices as primitive, but instead derives
her anticipation of these choices from her ex ante preference.
Adapt GP's list of axioms for the preference º.
Axiom 1 (Order). º is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all menus A 2 M0, the sets fB 2 M0 : B º
Ag and fB 2 M0 : B ¹ Ag are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all ® 2 [0;1] and menus A;B;C 2 M0,
A º B ) ®A + (1 ¡ ®)C º ®B + (1 ¡ ®)C:
Axiom 4 (Set-Betweenness). For all menus a;b 2 M1 and A;B 2 M0,
fag º fbg ) fag º fa [ bg º fbg; (1)
A º B ) A º A [ B º B: (2)
Order and Continuity are standard conditions of rationality. To motivate
Independence, interpret any mixture ®A + (1 ¡ ®)C as a lottery that yields
the menus A and C with probabilities ® and 1¡® respectively and is resolved
after the ex post stage. In this interpretation, the decision maker's interim
choice ®a+(1¡®)c in ®A+(1¡®)C and her ex post choice ®x+(1¡®)y
in ®a + (1 ¡ ®)c determine her consumptions x 2 a 2 A and y 2 c 2 C
contingent on the resolution of the lottery between the menus A and C. If
the timing of the resolution of this objective uncertainty is irrelevant for
preference, then the decision maker should be indi®erent between the menu
8®A + (1 ¡ ®)C and a hypothetical lottery ® ± A + (1 ¡ ®) ± C that yields
the menus A or C with probabilities ® and 1¡® respectively, but is resolved
immediately after the ex ante stage. (Here the preference º is extended
from the original domain M0 to lotteries over menus.) Then the standard
separability argument suggests that
A º B ) ® ± A + (1 ¡ ®) ± C º ® ± B + (1 ¡ ®) ± C
because the possibility of getting the menu C with probability 1 ¡ ® should
not a®ect the decision maker's comparison of A and B. Independence follows.
Set-Betweenness is imposed separately on the preference º over the entire
M0 and on the restriction of º to singleton menus fag that provide a strict
commitment to the menu a 2 M1 at the interim stage, but may still require
self-control ex post when choice in a has to be made. It is assumed that the
decision maker's ex ante evaluation of any such menu fag is based on her
anticipation of two factors:
² the consumption xa 2 a that she will choose if a is feasible ex post,
² the self-control that she will use to resist the strongest temptation
ya 2 a in this menu.
This informal assumption suggests that for all menus a;b 2 M1,
xb 2 a; ya 2 b ) fag º fbg: (3)
Indeed, if xb 2 a and ya 2 b, then the decision maker should expect that
if she chooses xa from the menu a at the ex post stage, then she will (i)
obtain the same consumption that she plans to choose from b and (ii) resist
the temptation ya, which belongs to b and hence, should not be harder to
resist than the strongest temptation yb in b. Therefore, the ranking fag º
fbg is intuitive because the menu a o®ers a weakly better combination of
consumption bene¯ts and self-control costs than b does. Condition (3) implies
(1).8 Analogously, condition (2) assumes that the decision maker should
evaluate any menu A 2 M0 based on her anticipated interim choice aA 2
A and the most tempting alternative bA 2 A in this menu. Note that if
8To show this claim, take any menus fag º fbg. Let c = a [ b. Then xa;xb;ya;yb 2 c.
By (3), if xc 2 a, then fag º fcg; if xc 2 b, then fbg º fcg. In either case, fag º fcg. By
(3), if yc 2 a, then fcg º fag; if yc 2 b, then fcg º fbg. In either case, fcg º fbg.
9temptations are cumulative or uncertain (as in Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini
[8]), then both parts of Set-Betweenness can be violated.
The following condition is used to obtain uniqueness in representation
results below.
Axiom 5 (Self-Control). There are x;y;x0;y0 2 X such that
ffxgg Â ffx;ygg Â ffygg
ffx
0gg Â ffx
0g;fy
0gg Â ffy
0gg:
This axiom requires that the decision maker should expect to have some
self-control at the ex post and interim stages, and plan to choose the alter-
native x and the singleton menu fx0g rather than the more tempting y and
fy0g respectively.
Say that a function u : X ! R is linear if for all ® 2 [0;1] and x;y 2 X,
u(®x + (1 ¡ ®)y) = ®u(x) + (1 ¡ ®)u(y):
Let U be the set of all continuous linear functions u : X ! R. Similarly,
de¯ne linearity for functions on M1 and let U1 be the set of all continuous
linear functions V : M1 ! R.
Theorem 1. The preference º satis¯es Axioms 1{4 if and only if º is
represented by a utility function U0 such that for all A 2 M0 and a 2 M1,
U0(A) = max
a2A
·
U(a) ¡ max
b2A
(V (b) ¡ V (a))
¸
(4)
U(a) = max
x2a
[u(x) ¡ max
y2a
(v(y) ¡ v(x))]; (5)
where u;v 2 U and V 2 U1.
Moreover, if º satis¯es Self-Control, then it has another representation
(4) with components u0;v0 2 U and V 0 2 U1 if and only if u0 = ®u + ¯u,
v0 = ®v + ¯v, and V 0 = ®V + ¯V for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v;¯V 2 R.
This theorem provides a joint characterization for GP's utility represen-
tations (4) and (5) over M0 and M1 respectively. The restriction of U to
M1 can be interpreted as the decision maker's ex ante normative perspec-
tive on what menu should be chosen at the interim stage. Temptations that
impact her at this stage are captured by V , and the nonnegative component
10maxb2A(V (b)¡V (a)) is interpreted as the self-control cost of choosing a from
A. Similarly, the function u can be interpreted as the ex ante normative per-
spective on what should be chosen at the ex post stage, and the nonnegative
term maxy2a(v(y) ¡ v(x)) as the mental cost of ex post self-control. These
interpretations suggest that in order to balance her normative perspective
with the costs of self-control, the decision maker should plan to maximize
U + V and u + v respectively at the interim and ex post stages.
Before turning to our models of distorted self-perception, note the bench-
mark case with V = 0 when the decision maker does not expect to have any
temptations at the interim stage. In this case, she obeys strategic rationality
so that for all A;B 2 M0
A º B ) A » A [ B:
Note that she may still anticipate costly temptations at the ex post stage, as
she may exhibit a preference for commitment fag Â fa [ bg for some menus
a;b 2 M1.
3 Self-Deception
We model self-deception as an interim temptation. The ex ante perspective is
the unmotivated perspective, but in the interim stage the agent is motivated
to change her perspective. Her vehicle for doing so is rationalizations, based
on the (unmodelled) process of selectively accessing her memory or gathering
evidence and reinterpreting or explaining away evidence. If the motivation to
change her perspective is strong enough, she fails to recognize her attempts
at self-deception, and interim choice follows her motivated perspective. In-
termediate levels of motivation are accompanied at best with suspicion of her
self-deception, but she is never clear-eyed. Greater degrees of suspicion lead
to greater underweighting of the new conclusions she is driven to draw on
the basis of the interim evaluation of her evidence, and this underweighting
is associated with a cost of disowning the very attractive reasoning.
Suspicion of self-deception plays a role here analogous to `self-control' in
GP's model. However it should be observed that the latter notion cannot be
invoked here without giving rise to a contradiction: exertion of self-control
against self-deception presupposes knowledge of self-deception, but there can
be no self-deception to begin with if there is knowledge of self-deception.
113.1 Axiom
An assessment our axiom for self-deception requires us to ¯rst identify some
possible rationalizations an agent may invoke in the interim period to manip-
ulate herself into temptation. Consider the following three rationalizations:
² Overestimation of propensity for self-control: \I will be tempted, but
I can stop myself after one drink, so there's no much harm hitting the
bar tonight".
² Underestimation of susceptibility to temptation: \I am not even going
to be tempted to have more than one drink".
² Relaxation in normative standards: \I am only going to live once, so I
really should allow myself to enjoy life a little more".
Each of these rationalizations may be used to justify a choice of a menu
that leads the agent into temptation. They diminish the negative value of
making such a choice by either denying the existence of temptation or by
acknowledging the temptation but denying the possibility of a normatively-
bad outcome.
Our axiom for self-deception re°ects the motivated nature self-deception.
It assumes roughly that the agent cannot be motivated (or at least not
strongly motivated) to choose a menu that fails to lead to the satisfaction of
her temptation preference.
Axiom 6 (Self-Deception). For all a;b 2 M1, if fa [ bg Â fbg, then
fag » fa;a [ bg and fb;a [ bg Â fbg:
The ranking fa[bg Â fbg suggests that the anticipated ex post choice in
the menu a[b belongs to a rather than to b. In the case where fag » fa[bg
(i.e., b does not contain greater temptation than a) the axiom is readily
defensible. The conclusion that a[b does not tempt a (i.e. fag » fa;a[bg)
holds since both menus contain the same temptation and the same ¯nal
choice. The conclusion that b is not chosen over a [ b (i.e., fb;a [ bg Â fbg)
holds since there is neither a normative or temptation desire to do so.
Consider next the nontrivial case where fag Â fa [ bg, that is, where b
contains greater temptation than a. Since a and a [ b lead to the same ¯nal
choice, and thus the same degree of satisfaction of desires, we hold that there
12can simply be no motivation for the agent to deceive herself into choosing
a [ b over a. Responding to the extra temptations in a [ b has no strategic
value, and thus cannot motivate the agent to distort her perceptions of her
ex post choice or temptation { as in the noted three rationalizations { in
order to induce a desire for a[b over a. Thus fag » fa;a[bg. We hold also
that the agent should not be able to deceive herself into choosing b rather
than a[b. Observe that distortions in anticipated choice based on the three
rationalizations cannot induce even a strict desire for b over a [ b, because
a [ b contains anything that can be chosen in b. Thus, in such a case, we
have fa [ bg » fb;a [ bg, which in turn implies fb;a [ bg Â fbg.
One case where a strict desire for b may arise is if the agent views her
actual ex post choice as her temptation. For instance, given the preference
fa[bg Â fbg hypothesized in the axiom, the agent may completely reverse her
normative and temptation perspectives and say: \I should indulge completely
in the menu a [ b, but I will be tempted to resist". Thus, if the agent
manipulates herself into believing that her perceived choice (based on any
of the three rationalization) out of a [ b lies in b, she may perceive this
choice as involving a struggle with a temptation to choose an alternative
that lies in a. In such a case b is strictly more desirable than a[b according
to the distorted perspective. It is not obvious that such cases are those
of self-deception: such extreme distorted perceptions appear characteristic
of an agent who has completely submitted to temptation rather than one
who is delicately trying to get past her normative defenses by appealing to
reason. Nevertheless, it should be noted that our axiom does not rule out
such possibilities since it permits fa[bg Â fb;a[bg. However, it disallows the
appeal of such interim temptation to exceed the direct appeal of temptations
in b at the ex post stage: if fa [ bg Â fbg, so that the temptation in b is
not strong enough to impact choice in a [ b, then our axiom requires that a
motivated interim temptation by b is also not strong enough to impact choice
in fb;a [ bg.
3.2 Representation Result
Say that functions u;v 2 U are independent if for all ®;¯;° 2 R,
®u + ¯v + ° = 0 ) ® = ¯ = ° = 0:
Note that u and v are independent if and only if the functions u;v;u + v
represent three di®erent rankings on X.
13Theorem 2. º satis¯es Axioms 1{6 if and only if º has a utility represen-
tation (4){(5) such that for all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·U(a) + ¸max
y2a
v(y); (6)
where · ¸ ¸ > 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
Moreover, º has another representation (4), (5), (6) with parameters
·0;¸0 2 R and functions u0;v0 2 U if and only if ·0 = ·, ¸0 = ¸, u0 = ®u+¯u,
and v0 = ®v + ¯v for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v 2 R.
Here the temptation utility V can be interpreted as a distortion of the
interim normative utility U in the direction of the ex post desires v. This
distortion takes the form
V (a) = (· ¡ ¸)max
x2a
·
·
·¡¸u(x) + ¸
·¡¸v(x) ¡ max
y2a
(v(y) ¡ v(x))
¸
(7)
if · > ¸, or
V (a) = ·max
x2a
(u(x) + v(x)) (8)
if · = ¸. To interpret, compare (7) with (5) to see that interim desires V
in (7) modify the ex ante perspective U by replacing the ex ante normative
perspective u with
u
¤ = ·
·¡¸u + ¸
·¡¸v:
The perspective underlying u¤ distorts u in the direction of the temptation
utility v. It is as if the decision maker is tempted to believe that her ex
ante normative perspective was too stoic, and that she should permit her-
self to follow her desires to a greater extent according to a new normative
perspective u¤ that more closely follows v. The case (8) is a limiting case
of (7) where the decision maker is tempted to view u + v as her normative
perspective and to turn a blind eye to any possibility of temptation. It is as
if by adjusting her normative perspective she believes that she is resolving
all internal con°ict.
A surprising observation is that, according to the interim temptation per-
spective in both (7) or (8), the agent's anticipated ex post choice maximizes
u + v. That is, anticipated choice is undistorted. Therefore, while represen-
tations (7) and (8) accommodate a distortion in normative perspective and
possible blindness to temptation, they do not accommodate a distortion in
anticipated self-control ability. Evidently then, of the three rationalizations
14our axiom is consistent with, the third must always hold and the second
may hold simultaneously, but the ¯rst can never hold. Moreover, anticipated
choice is never distorted by any rationalization she adopts.
These conclusions are not tied to the functional form, but rather are
supported with behavior. The statement that our self-deceived agent is nec-
essarily tempted to change her normative perspective is captured in the fact
that there must exist singleton menus a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa;bg.
Since the evaluation of singletons does not involve any (non-trivial) evalu-
ation of ex post choice, this expresses an interim con°ict surrounding only
what should be consumed ex post. The statement that our self-deceived
agent is not tempted to misperceive ex post choice (and thus self-control
ability) is re°ected in the following behavior:9
fag Â fa [ bg =) fa;bg » fa;a [ bg: (9)
That is, if b contains tempting alternatives, then there is never a situation
where the temptation by a[b di®ers from the temptation by b. A di®erence
would arise if, for instance, the agent's actual anticipated choice from a [ b
was in b (ex ante anticipated lack of self-control) but she was tempted to
misperceived her choice from a[b to lie in a (temptation-anticipated exertion
of self-control). In such a case the agent would be tempted to view a[b more
favorably than b, and consequently, fa;bg Â fa;a [ bg.
4 Multiple Self-Deceptions
Our self-deception model rules out the possibility of a virtuous distortion
in her perceived ability to exert self-control. We present here an extension
that accommodates such virtuous distortion of self-perception. Although
the general model will not be compatible with an interpretation involving
sophisticated desires with a single motive, it helps identify some intuitive
behaviors ruled out by the model in the previous section and lends itself to
discussion of welfare.
9To show this claim, take any a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa[bg. Then V (a[b) ¸ V (b)
because U(a [ b) ¸ U(b) and maxy2a[b v(y) = maxy2b v(y). Consider two cases.
(i) fag » fa;a [ bg Â fa [ bg. Then V (a) ¸ V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) and hence, fag » fa;bg.
(ii) fag Â fa;a [ bg. By Self-Deception, fa [ bg » fbg, that is, U(a [ b) = U(b). By
(6), V (a [ b) = V (b). Thus, fa;bg » fa;a [ bg.
15In the self-deception model, temptation by b is motivated by the choice
that the agents expects to make in b. The following axiom accommodates
temptations that are motivated also by the normative content in b.
Axiom 7 (Binary Self-Deception). For all a;b 2 M1,
(i) if fa [ bg Â fbg, then fb;a [ bg Â fbg,
(ii) if fa [ bg Â fbg and fag Â fa;a [ bg, then there is z 2 b such that
ffzgg Â ffxgg for all x 2 a.
This condition relaxes Self-Deception and allows the menu a[b to tempt
a when the anticipated ex post choices in both menus are the same, but the
menu a [ b provides a more virtuous interim self-perception. Formally, the
rankings fa [ bg Â fbg and fag Â fa;a [ bg are allowed only if a [ b has an
element z that is normatively better than any alternative in a. It is as if the
agent has an exaggerated view of her propensity for self-control.
A departure from a single-motive self-deception is evident here: interim
temptation is no longer intimately connected with a desire to achieve ex
post satisfaction of desires. An excessively virtuous self-image may lead the
agent to temptation only by accident, and in some situations may even defeat
e®orts at ex post desire satisfaction. It follows that the tendency toward a
virtuous self-perception satis¯es a di®erent desire { presumably the desire
for a positive self-image { that is distinct from ex post temptation. We thus
interpret the axiom as adding a second kind of self-deception, one involved
in positive illusions. However, due to the abstract nature of our framework,
we cannot strictly speaking justify this interpretation relative to, say, wishful
thinking.
Theorem 3. º satis¯es Axioms 1{5 and Binary Self-Deception if and only
if º has a utility representation (4){(5) such that for all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·U(a) + ¸max
y2a
v(y) + ¹max
z2a
u(z) (10)
where · ¸ ¸ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
Moreover, º has another representation (4), (5), (6) with parameters
·0;¸0;¹0 2 R and functions u0;v0 2 U if and only if ·0 = ·, ¸0 = ¸, ¹ = ¹0,
u0 = ®u + ¯u, and v0 = ®v + ¯v for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v 2 R.
16The di®erence between (10) and (6) is the additional term ¹maxz2a u(z)
in the interim temptation utility V . Although the model o®ers up to three
rationalizations for choosing a given menu (namely, distorted normative pref-
erence, distorted temptation preference and perceived virtuosity), the ratio-
nalizations may be inconsistent. For instance, if the menu contains irresistible
temptation, then one rationalization will recognize this and justify it accord-
ing to a more relaxed normative perspective, while the other will refuse to
recognize it.10 The rationalizations may also neutralize each other, such as
when a is more virtuous than b and b contains greater temptation. These are
re°ections of the fact noted above that the model is not one of temptation-
driven self-deception. Such self-deception would presumably involve a search
for the strongest possible case for making a `bad' decision, and such a case
would be as devoid of inconsistencies as possible. Nevertheless, as a model
of an agent who engages in rationalizations more broadly, it permits some
substantive discussion of welfare, to which we now turn.
The implication (9) of the pure self-deception model does not hold in
general. Formally, write a º0 b if there exists z 2 a such that ffzgg º ffxgg
for all x 2 b. Then the preference º represented by (10) satis¯es11
fag Â fa [ bg and a º0 b ) fa;bg º fa;a [ bg:
This condition implies that if b is a `vice' menu and a is a `virtuous' menu,
then the agent is generally better o® if virtue and vice are kept separate
(as in fa;bg) rather than combined (as in fa;a [ bg). The intuition is that
the union a [ b lends itself to more excuses for the agent to lead herself
into temptation. Indeed, in this case, given whatever rationalizations the
agent may adopt to justify choosing b from fa;bg, virtuous self-perception
is an additional rationalization that can be invoked to justify choosing a [
10Behaviorally, suppose ffxgg Â ffx;ygg » ffygg. Then fx;yg may be more tempting
than both fxg and fyg. That is, ffxg;fygg Â ffxg;fyg;fx;ygg. Since one rationalization
favors fxg and the other favors fyg, the fact that fx;yg is more tempting than either
implies the simultaneous use of both rationalizations.
11To show this claim, take any a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa [ bg and maxz2a u(z) ¸
maxz2b u(z). Then V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) because U(a [ b) ¸ U(b) and maxy2a[b v(y) =
maxy2b v(y). Consider two cases.
(i) fag » fa;a [ bg. Then V (a) ¸ V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) and hence, fag » fa;bg.
(ii) fag Â fa;a[bg. By Binary Self-Deception, fa[bg » fbg, that is, U(a[b) = U(b).
Therefore, V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) implies fa;bg º fa;a [ bg.
17b from fa;a [ bg. The behavioral implication suggests, for instance, that
a procrastinor is better-o® if a completely °exible option is not a feasible
choice: if a is the option of completing the task sooner and b is the option of
completing it later, then having the opportunity to make this decision later
(as in fa;a [ bg) makes her worse-o® relative to a situation where she has
to decide today whether to complete the task sooner or later (as in fa;bg).
For another example, view a menu as a physical location selling particular
alternatives and a menu of menus as a town. Then agents in a town are
better-o® if virtue and vice are sold at distinct locations (as in fa;bg) relative
to when vice is always bundled with virtue (as in fa;a[bg). Zoning laws for
casinos may be welfare improving in this sense.
A common view is that optimal welfare policy for agents with self-control
problems constitutes the provision of commitment opportunities. In the
above setting, this would correspond to providing the agent with fa;a [ bg,
in which she may keep all her options by selecting a [ b or avoid tempta-
tion by choosing the commitment option a. The above discussion suggests
that when agents are subject to self-deception, then the simple provision of
commitment opportunities may not always be optimal.
5 Comparative Self-Deception
To interpret the parameters ·, ¸, and ¹ in terms of choice behavior, consider
a pair of preferences º and º¤ over M0. Call this pair regular if both º and
º¤ satisfy Axioms 1{5 and BSD, and the two rankings agree on the domain
of singleton menus so that
fag º fbg , fag º
¤ fbg
for all a;b 2 M1.
By Theorem 3, any regular pair of preferences º and º¤ can be rep-
resented by (4)-(6) with components (u;v;·;¸;¹) and (u¤;v¤;·¤;¸¤;¹¤) re-
spectively. Moreover, the functions U and U¤ represent the same preference
on M1 and hence, by GP's Theorem, one can take u = u¤ and v = v¤.
Say that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º if for all menus a;b 2 M1,
fag Â fa;bg ) fag Â
¤ fa;bg; (11)
This de¯nition requires that any self-deception that is tempting for º should
be tempting for º¤ as well.
18Theorem 4. Let º and º¤ be a regular pair of preferences. Then º¤ is more
self-deceptive than º if and only if the two preferences have representations
(4)-(6) such that ¸¤
·¤ ¸ ¸
· and
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸.
This result suggests that the ratios ¸
· and
¹
· are both positively related to
the intensity of self-deception in our model. (Note that ¸¤
·¤ ¸ ¸
· and
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸
imply
¹¤
·¤ ¸
¹
·.) If · > ¸, then the weight ¸
·¡¸ that is put on the function v
in (7) is a positive monotonic transformation of ¸
· and hence, can serve as an
index of self-deception as well.
Moreover, the equality
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸ is necessary for an unambiguous compari-
son of self-deception revealed by the two rankings º and º¤. This equality
requires roughly that the proportion of the virtuous and motivated com-
ponents of self-deception should be the same for º and º¤. In particular,
this must be true when both º and º¤ satisfy Self-Deception and hence,
¹ = ¹¤ = 0.
6 Conclusion
On an intuitive level, one would expect that an exaggerated self-perception
of virtuosity may serve as a strategic tool for desires to induce the agent to
make decisions that will lead her into temptation. Yet, necessary behavioral
properties of self-deception (Motivated Self-Deception and Self-Deception),
when imposed on a GP-style model, do not permit any such distorted self-
perceptions and instead necessitate a distortion in one's normative perspec-
tive and may imply complete denial regarding the possibility of temptation
against the new normative perspective. In particular, any distortion in ex-
pectation about future choice behavior (and propensity for self-control) is
ruled out. Thus, we ¯nd that in order to accommodate the intuitive possi-
bility of a distortion in perception of future choice behavior to be `triggered'
whenever it serves desires, one needs to go beyond GP's model.
We envision a general model of self-deception to have the following fea-
tures. There may be a set of rationalizations that the agent can adopt, which
may include distorted normative perspectives, virtuous self-perception, or a
biased interpretation of evidence (not modelled in this paper). At the time
of interim choice, particular rationalizations are adopted only if they serve
desire, that is, only when they cause the agent to choose a menu containing
irresistible temptation. How tempting a menu is at the interim stage de-
19pends on how many rationalizations the agent can conjur up and whether
these rationalizations are convincing in the sense of not contradicting each
other. Indeed, the existence of consistent rationalizations may be a necessary
condition for a menu to even tempt.
A APPENDIX: PROOFS
In the proofs, we use the following notation and terminology. For any func-
tion u 2 U and any menu a 2 M1, write
u(a) = max
x2a
u(x);
and let
T (u) = f®u + ¯ : ® ¸ 0;¯ 2 Rg
be the set of all non-negative transformations of the function u. Say that
functions u1;:::;un 2 U are redundant if there is a constant function ui in
this list, or if ui = ·uj + ¯ for some i 6= j, · > 0 and ¯ 2 R.
For any S 2 N, let S denote also the set f1;:::;Sg. The following result
is invoked from Kopylov [13].
Lemma 5. For any u1;:::;uS 2 U, there are elements x1;:::;xS 2 X such
that for all i;j 2 S, ui(xi) ¸ ui(xj), and
ui = 2 T (uj) , ui(xi) > ui(xj): (12)
Proof. Take any k;l 2 S and consider two possible cases.
(i) uk 2 T (ul). Take xkl;ykl 2 X such that uk(xkl) ¸ uk(ykl).
(ii) uk = 2 T (ul). Then by Herstein{Milnor's Theorem, there are xkl;ykl 2 X
such that uk(xkl) > uk(ykl) and ul(ykl) ¸ ul(xkl).
For all i 2 S, let xi
kl = xkl if ui(xkl) > ui(ykl) and xi
kl = ykl otherwise. Let
xi =
X
k;l2S
1
S2x
i
kl:
Take any i;j 2 S. Then ui(xi
kl) ¸ ui(x
j
kl) for all k;l 2 S, and hence,
ui(xi) =
X
k;l2S
1
S2ui(x
i
kl) ¸
X
k;l2S
1
S2ui(x
j
kl) = ui(xj):
20Moreover, if ui = 2 T (uj), then
ui(x
i
ij) = ui(xij) > ui(yij) = ui(x
j
ij);
and hence, ui(xi) > ui(xj). Conversely, the inequalities ui(xi) > ui(xj) and
uj(xj) ¸ uj(xi) imply that ui = 2 T (uj).
The necessity of Axioms 1{4 in Theorem 1 is straightforward. Conversely,
suppose that º satis¯es Axioms 1{4. Kopylov [15, Theorem 1] shows that º
has a utility representation
U0(A) = max
a2A;x2a
·
u(x) ¡ max
y2a
(v(y) ¡ v(x)) ¡ max
b2A
(V (b) ¡ V (a))
¸
for some u;v 2 U and V 2 U1. Moreover, if º satis¯es Self-Control, then
the triple (u;v;V ) in this representation is unique up to a positive linear
transformation. The utility function U0 has the required form (4)-(5), where
U(a) = max
x2a
[u(x) ¡ max
y2a
(v(y) ¡ v(x))]
for all menus a 2 M1. Let w = u + v and W = U + V . Then
U0(A) = max
a2A
W(a) ¡ max
b2A
V (b) (13)
U(a) = w(a) ¡ v(a) (14)
for all A 2 M0 and a 2 M1.
Turn to Theorems 2 and 3. Suppose that º satis¯es Axioms 1{5 and
Binary Self-Deception (BSD for short). By Theorem 1, º is represented by
(13). By Self-Control, there are x¤;y¤ 2 X such that
ffx
¤gg Â ffx
¤;y
¤gg Â ffy
¤gg:
Then w(x¤) > w(y¤) and v(y¤) > v(x¤), and hence, w and v are not redun-
dant. Without loss in generality, assume that
u(x
¤) = v(x
¤) = w(x
¤) = V (fx
¤g) = 0: (15)
The following two lemmas obtain the required form for V .
Lemma 6. There are ·;½;¹ 2 R such that for all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·w(a) + ½v(a) + ¹u(a): (16)
21Proof. We claim ¯rst that for all a;b 2 M1,
w(a) = w(b); v(a) = v(b); u(a) = u(b) ) V (a) = V (b): (17)
Show this claim by contradiction. Consider any a;b 2 M1 such that w(a) =
w(b), v(a) = v(b), u(a) = u(b), but V (b) > V (a). By (14), U(a) = U(b) and
hence, W(b) > W(a). As W is continuous, then there is " > 0 such that
W("fy
¤g + (1 ¡ ")b) > W("fx
¤g + (1 ¡ ")a):
Let a¤ = "fx¤g + (1 ¡ ")a and b¤ = "fy¤g + (1 ¡ ")b. As w(x¤) > w(y¤),
v(y¤) > v(x¤), and u(x¤) > u(y¤), then by linearity, w(a¤) = w(a¤ [ b¤) >
w(b¤), v(b¤) = v(a¤ [ b¤) > v(a¤), and u(a¤) = u(a¤ [ b¤) > u(b¤). By (14),
U(a
¤) > U(a
¤ [ b
¤) > U(b
¤):
As W(b¤) > W(a¤), then there are two possible cases.
² W(b¤) > W(a¤ [ b¤). Then V (b¤) > V (a¤ [ b¤). By (13), fb¤g »
fb¤;a¤ [ b¤g, which contradicts BSD.
² W(a¤ [ b¤) > W(a¤). Then V (a¤ [ b¤) > V (a¤). By (13), fa¤g Â
fa¤;a¤ [ b¤g, which contradicts BSD because u(a¤) > u(b¤).
This contradiction shows (17).
Take any four menus a1;a2;a3;a4 2 M1. Let a = [4
i=1ai. There is i
such that w(a) ¸ w(ai), v(a) ¸ v(ai), and u(a) ¸ u(ai). Let b = [j6=iaj.
Then w(a) = w(b), v(a) = v(b), and u(a) = u(b). By (17), V (a) = V (b).
Kopylov [14, Theorem 2.1] implies that the ranking that V represents on M1
is represented also by
V
0(a) =
S X
i=1
°iui(a) (18)
such that S · 3, °1;:::;°S 2 f¡1;1g, and u1;:::;uS 2 U are not redundant.
As both V 0 and V are linear, then without loss in generality, V 0 = V .
We claim that for all i 2 f1;:::;Sg,
ui 2 T (w) [ T (v) [ T (u): (19)
22Wlog let i = 1, and suppose that u1 = 2 T (w)[T (v)[T (u): Then by Lemma
5, there are x1;:::;xS;xS+1;xS+2;xS+3 such that
u1(x1) > u1(xj) for all j 6= 1
ui(xi) ¸ ui(xj) for all i > 1 and j 6= i
w(xS+1) ¸ w(xj) for all j 6= S + 1
v(xS+2) ¸ v(xj) for all j 6= S + 2
u(xS+3) ¸ u(xj) for all j 6= S + 3:
Let a = fx1;:::;xS+3g and b = fx2;:::;xS+3g. Then u1(a) = u1(x1) >
u1(b), but w(a) = w(b), v(a) = v(b), u(a) = u(b), and uj(a) = uj(b) for all
j 6= 1. Thus,
V (b) ¡ V (a) = V
0(b) ¡ V
0(a) = °i(ui(xi) ¡ ui(a)) 6= 0;
which contradicts (17).
The equalities (18) and (19) and the normalization (15) imply (16).
The previous lemma implies that
W(a) = U(a) + V (a) = (· + 1)w(a) + (½ ¡ 1)v(a) + ¹u(a)
= (· + 1)U(a) + (· + ½)v(a) + ¹u(a)
(20)
for all menus a 2 M1.
Lemma 7. The functions u;v are independent. The parameters ·;½;¹ are
unique and satisfy ½ · 0, · + ½ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0. If º satis¯es Self-Deception,
then ¹ = 0.
Proof. Let a = fx¤g and b = fy¤g. By (14), fag Â fa [ bg Â fbg. By BSD,
V (a) ¸ V (a [ b). By (16),
V (a[b)¡V (a) = ·(w(x
¤)¡w(x
¤))+½(v(y
¤)¡v(x
¤))+¹(u(x
¤)¡u(x
¤)) · 0:
Thus, ½ · 0. To prove the other claims of the lemma, consider two cases.
Case 1. w, v, u are redundant. Then u must be a positive linear trans-
formation of w or v. If u = ®v for some ® > 0, then w = u + v and v are
redundant. Thus, u = ®w for some ® > 0. Then v = (® ¡ 1)w. As w and v
are not redundant, then ® 2 (0;1). For all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·w(a) + ½v(a) + ¹u(a) = (·
0 + ½)U(a) + ½v(a);
W(a) = (·
0 + 1)U(a) + (·
0 + ½)v(a);
23where ·0 = · + ¹®. Suppose that ·0 + ½ < 0. Take ®;¯ 2 (0; 1
2) such that
1 <
®
¯
w(x¤) ¡ w(y¤)
v(y¤) ¡ v(x¤)
< 1 +
¯
¯
¯
¯
·0 + ½
·0 + 1
¯
¯
¯
¯: (21)
Let a = fx¤;y¤g and b = f®y¤ + (1 ¡ ®)x¤;¯x¤ + (1 ¡ ¯)y¤g. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x
¤) ¡ w(®y
¤ + (1 ¡ ®)x
¤) = ®(w(x
¤) ¡ w(y
¤)) > 0
v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y
¤) ¡ v(¯x
¤ + (1 ¡ ¯)y
¤) = ¯(v(y
¤) ¡ v(x
¤)) > 0:
By (21) and (20),
U(a [ b) ¡ U(b) = ®(w(x
¤) ¡ w(y
¤)) ¡ ¯(v(y
¤) ¡ v(x
¤)) > 0
j(·
0 + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b))j < j·
0 + ½j¯(v(y
¤) ¡ v(x
¤))
W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (·
0 + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b)) + (·
0 + ½)¯(v(y
¤) ¡ v(x
¤)) < 0:
Therefore, fa[bg Â fbg, but fb;a[bg » fbg, which contradicts BSD. Thus,
·0 + ½ ¸ 0. Thus, for all x 2 X,
V (fxg) = (·
0 + ½)U(fxg) + ½®¡1
® u(x) = °U(fxg);
where ° = (·0 + ½) + ½®¡1
® is positive. By (13) and (14), for all x;y 2 X,
ffxgg º ffygg ) ffxgg » ffxg;fygg º ffygg;
which violates Self-Control.
Case 2. w, v, u are not redundant. Then u and v are independent, and
there are x;y;z 2 X such that
w(x) > w(y) _ w(z)
v(y) > v(x) _ v(z)
u(z) > u(x) _ u(y):
Suppose that ¹ < 0. Take ® 2 (0;1) such that
®(· + 1)(w(x) ¡ w(y)) + ¹(u(z) ¡ u(x)) < 0:
Let a = fx;y;zg and b = fy;®y + (1 ¡ ®)xg. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x) ¡ w(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) > 0
v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y) ¡ v(y) = 0
u(a [ b) ¡ u(b) = u(z) ¡ u(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) ¸ u(z) ¡ u(x) > 0:
24By (14), U(a [ b) ¡ U(b) = w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) > 0: By (20),
W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (· + 1)(w(a [ b) ¡ w(b)) + ¹(u(a [ b) ¡ u(b)) ·
®(· + 1)(w(x) ¡ w(y)) + ¹(u(z) ¡ u(x)) < 0:
Therefore, fa [ bg Â fbg and fb;a [ bg » fbg. These rankings violate BSD.
Thus, ¹ ¸ 0.
Suppose that · + ½ < 0. Take ®;¯ 2 (0; 1
2) such that
1 <
®
¯
w(x) ¡ w(y)
v(y) ¡ v(x)
< 1 +
¯
¯
¯
¯
· + ½
· + 1
¯
¯
¯
¯: (22)
Let a = fx;y;zg and b = f®y + (1 ¡ ®)x;¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y;zg. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x) ¡ w(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) > 0
v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y) ¡ v(¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y) = ¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) > 0
u(a [ b) ¡ u(b) = u(z) ¡ u(z) = 0:
By (22) and (20),
U(a [ b) ¡ U(b) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) ¡ ¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) > 0
j(· + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b))j < j· + ½j¯(v(y) ¡ v(x))
W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (· + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b)) + (· + ½)¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) < 0:
Therefore, fa[bg Â fbg, but fb;a[bg » fbg, which contradicts BSD. Thus,
· + ½ ¸ 0.
Suppose that · + ½ = 0. Then for all x0 2 X,
V (fx
0g) = ·U(fx
0g) + ¹u(x
0) = (· + ¹)U(fx
0g);
where · + ¹ = ¡½ + ¹ ¸ 0. This equality contradicts Self-Control (see the
proof of Case 1.) Thus, · + ½ > 0.
Suppose that º satis¯es Self-Deception. Let a = fx;yg and b = fy;zg.
Then fa [ bg Â fbg. By Self-Deception,
V (a) ¡ V (a [ b) = ¹(u(x) ¡ u(z)) ¸ 0:
Thus, ¹ = 0.
25Finally, note that
· =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (f®z + (1 ¡ ®)x;y;zg)
®(w(x) ¡ w(z))
½ =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (fx;®x + (1 ¡ ®)y;zg)
®(v(y) ¡ v(x))
¹ =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (fx;y;®x + (1 ¡ ®)zg)
®(u(z) ¡ u(x))
for all su±ciently small ®. These equations show that all of these parameters
are unique.
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that V has the required form
V (a) = ·U(a) + ¸v(a) + ¹u(a) = ·w(a) + (¸ ¡ ·)v(a) + ¹u(a); (23)
where · ¸ ¸ = · + ½ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
Conversely, suppose that º has representation (13), (14), and (23). Take
any a;b 2 M1 such that fa [ bg Â fbg. By (23),
V (a [ b) ¡ V (b) = ·(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b)) + ¸(v(a [ b) ¡ v(b))+
¹(u(a [ b) ¡ u(b)) ¸ 0
because U(a [ b) > U(b), v(a [ b) ¸ v(b), and u(a [ b) ¸ u(b). By (13),
fa [ bg » fb;a [ bg Â fbg:
Moreover,
V (a) ¡ V (a [ b) = ·(w(a) ¡ w(a [ b)) + (¸ ¡ ·)(v(a) ¡ v(a [ b))+
¹(u(a) ¡ u(a [ b)) ¸ ¹(u(a) ¡ u(a [ b))
because w(a) = w(a [ b), v(a [ b) ¸ v(a), and ¸ ¡ · · 0. Therefore, the
ranking fag Â fa;a[bg implies that ¹ > 0 and u(b) > u(a). Thus º satis¯es
Binary Self-Deception, and if ¹ = 0, then º satis¯es Self-Deception.
As u and v are independent, then w and v are not redundant. Take
x;y 2 X such that w(x) > w(y) and v(y) > v(x). By (14),
ffxgg Â ffx;ygg Â ffygg:
26Let v0 = (· + ¹)u + ¸v and w0 = u + v0. As u and v are independent and
¸ > 0, then the functions w0 and v0 are not redundant. Take x0;y0 2 X such
that w0(x0) > w0(y0) and v0(y0) > v0(x0). By (13),
ffx
0gg Â ffx
0g;fy
0gg Â ffy
0gg:
Thus, º satis¯es Self-Control.
Turn to Theorem 4. Suppose that º and º¤ have representations (4)-(6)
with components (u;v;·;¸;¹) and (u;v;·¤;¸¤;¹¤) such that · ¸ ¸ > 0,
·¤ ¸ ¸¤ > 0, and ¹;¹¤ ¸ 0.
Suppose that ¸¤
·¤ ¸ ¸
· and
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸. Then U = U¤ and for all a;b 2 M1,
fag Â fa;bg ) U(a) > U(b) and V (b) > V (a) )
[U(b) ¡ U(a)] + ¸
·[v(b) ¡ v(a) +
¹
¸u(b) ¡
¹
¸u(a)] > 0 > U(b) ¡ U(a) )
[U
¤(b)¡U
¤(a)]+ ¸¤
·¤[v(b)¡v(a)+
¹¤
¸¤u(b)¡
¹¤
¸¤u(a)] > 0 > U
¤(b)¡U
¤(a) )
U
¤(a) > U
¤(b) and V
¤(b) > V
¤(a) ) fag Â
¤ fa;bg:
Thus, º¤ is more self-deceptive than º.
Conversely, suppose that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º. As u and v
are independent, then the functions u, v, and w = u + v are not redundant.
By Lemma 5, there are x;y;z 2 X such that
w(x) > w(y) _ w(z)
v(y) > v(x) _ v(z)
u(z) > u(x) _ u(y):
As w;v;u 2 U, then for any ®;° > 0, there exist x0;y0;z0 2 X such that
w(x) > w(x
0) > w(y) _ w(y
0) _ w(z) _ w(z
0)
v(y) > v(y
0) > v(x) _ v(x
0) _ v(z) _ v(z
0)
u(z) > u(z
0) > u(x) _ u(x
0) _ u(y) _ u(y
0)
w(x) ¡ w(x0)
v(y) ¡ v(y0)
= ®
v(y) ¡ v(y0)
u(z) ¡ u(z0)
= °:
(24)
Show the inequalities ¸¤
·¤ ¸ ¸
· and
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸ by contradiction. Consider three
cases.
27Case 1.
¹¤
¸¤ >
¹
¸. Take ° such that
¹¤
¸¤ > ° >
¹
¸ and ® such that 1 >
® > 1 ¡
°¸¡¹
°· : Take x0;y0;z0 2 X that satisfy (24). Let a = fx0;y0;zg and
b = fx;y;z0g. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) ¡ (w(x) ¡ v(y)) = (1 ¡ ®)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V (b) ¡ V (a) =
³
¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸ ¡
¹
°
´
(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V
¤(b) ¡ V
¤(a) =
³
¡·
¤(1 ¡ ®) + ¸
¤ ¡
¹¤
°¤
´
(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) < 0
because
¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸ ¡
¹
° > 0 > ¡·
¤(1 ¡ ®) + ¸
¤ ¡
¹¤
° :
Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption
that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º.
Case 2.
¹¤
¸¤ <
¹
¸. Take ° such that
¹¤
¸¤ < ° <
¹
¸ and ® such that 1 <
® < 1 +
¹¡°¸
°· : Take x0;y0;z0 2 X that satisfy (24). Let a = fx;y;z0g and
b = fx0;y0;zg. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x) ¡ v(y)) ¡ (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) = (® ¡ 1)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V (b) ¡ V (a) =
³
¡·(® ¡ 1) ¡ ¸ +
¹
°
´
(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V
¤(b) ¡ V
¤(a) =
³
¡·
¤(® ¡ 1) ¡ ¸
¤ +
¹¤
°¤
´
(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) < 0
because
¡·(® ¡ 1) ¡ ¸ +
¹
° > 0 > ¡·
¤(® ¡ 1) ¡ ¸
¤ +
¹¤
° :
Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption
that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º.
Case 3.
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸ and ¸¤
·¤ < ¸
·. Take ® such that 1 ¡ ¸¤
·¤ > ® > 1 ¡ ¸
·: Take
x0;y0 2 X that satisfy (24). (z0 is not required here.) Let a = fx0;y0;zg and
b = fx;y;zg. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) ¡ (w(x) ¡ v(y)) = (1 ¡ ®)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V (b) ¡ V (a) = (¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V
¤(b) ¡ V
¤(a) = (¡·
¤(1 ¡ ®) + ¸
¤)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) < 0
because
¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸ > 0 > ¡·
¤(1 ¡ ®) + ¸
¤:
28Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption
that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º.
Thus,
¹¤
¸¤ =
¹
¸ and ¸¤
·¤ ¸ ¸
·.
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